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Abstract 
Despite optimistic expectations fast diffusion of 
mobile payments has not taken place after a decade of 
trials. Several explanations to this situation have been 
put forward using several theories and levels of 
analysis. Due to the complexity and dynamism of the 
diffusion we need multiple perspectives to account for 
diffusion challenge. We juxtapose three frameworks 
into a dynamic analysis framework. We apply the 
proposed framework to explain three failed 
introductions of mobile payments in the Swiss market. 
In particular, a recent ambitious trial is confronted 
with the proposed framework to detect roots of its 
failure. Our analysis suggests that market-level and 
behavioral facets need more attention in future in 
explaining mobile payment diffusion. To guide future 
efforts we propose several avenues for further 
research. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With the widespread adoption of mobile phones for 
voice and text messaging, a recurrent question raised 
is: what will be the next killer application? Many 
analysts, consultants, and researchers have focused on 
this question, and, not surprisingly, mobile payments 
have often been identified as a good candidate. Being 
able to pay with a mobile phone that you carry with 
you anyway looks an obvious alternative given the fact 
that now over 80% of Western people carry a mobile 
phone, and the fast developments in e-/m-commerce 
and electronic payment technologies. Furthermore, 
mobile payments are necessary to carry out 
transactions that involve digital content (e.g., 
ringtones, news, music). Mobile payments can provide 
also new payment schemes and services for widely 
used debit and credit cards.  
Despite this promise up to this point only few cases 
of limited success can be identified in mobile 
payments. Japan, South Korea, Singapore lead the pack 
[19] as these countries offer now mobile payment 
services that can be used in several purchase scenarios, 
such as manned and unmanned, remote and proximity 
payments for physical and digital goods. Even though, 
their deployed technologies and services are more 
varied and advanced, the usage rates are still low and 
now wide spread diffusion has taken place [2]. One 
fundamental reason is that mobile payments require 
customers to change their behaviors towards tightly 
ingrained payment habits. Learning from the history of 
credit card adoption [6] it will take time before the 
mass-adoption of payment systems is reached. In 
Europe and the U.S., most solutions have been 
launched for specific purposes (e.g. digital content, 
parking, vending machines). These niche markets 
ensure a relatively secure business case, but the growth 
potential of these mobile payments remains highly 
limited. 
The reason why most Western countries have not 
been able to deploy mobile payments in a massive 
scale has not been scrutinized carefully. It appears that 
the success of mobile payments depends greatly on the 
effective alignment between a business model and 
physical environment in which it will be launched. Our 
objective in this paper is to examine factors that 
influence the success of the proposed mobile payment 
scheme. In particular, we will examine impending 
factors that lead either to the failure of developing a 
robust business model, or to the low uptake of the 
proposed solutions. In previous research [13], we 
applied multi-criteria decision-making methods 
(MCDM) to understand what shapes different player’s 
decision making in mobile payment markets. In this 
study we expand this line of research with an inquiry 
into institutional, economic and behavioral factors that 
shape mobile payment provisioning and adoption. To 
this end we juxtapose three frameworks to analyze 
mobile payment diffusion. The first framework leans 
on the economic analysis of the mobile payment 
markets [1]. The second one looks at strategic and 
environmental drivers [5]. Finally, the third one 
focuses on resources and business drivers that shape 
mobile payment provisioning [3]. 
We apply the frameworks to explore the failure of 
three Swiss mobile payment cases, which we have 
been following for about 5 years. Based on our 
longitudinal research [13], we confront the frameworks 
with the process and use data derived from the cases. 
We select one of these cases involving most extensive 
mobile payment trial data for detailed scrutiny to 
illustrate why it failed and how it misaligned with a 
number of critical factors. 
We bring our contribution in two fronts. First, by 
juxtaposing and integrating the frameworks we offer a 
more encompassing framework for the analysis of the 
(failed) diffusion of mobile payments. Second, by 
using the three frameworks together we reveal their 
weaknesses and strengths and thus help formulating 
more encompassing frameworks that could be applied 
to deliver complex mobile payment infrastructures.  
In the next section, we briefly summarize previous 
research into mobile payments, introduce the 
frameworks, and identify aspects that have not been 
covered well in the extant research. Then, we describe 
three Swiss mobile payment cases that are used in the 
subsequent analysis. Next, we use three frameworks to 
analyze the cases and, in particular, to describe in 
detail the failure of one of the cases - the PostFinance 
payment system. We conclude by outlining three lines 
for future research. First, we evaluate the benefit of 
using the three frameworks and reflect on their merits. 
Second, we look at the Swiss case findings and 
delineate factors that are likely to influence the failure 
of similar future systems. Third, we propose lines of 
future research to understand mobile payment 
infrastructure evolution based on a multi-perspective 
analysis. 
 
2. Related work  
 
According to Dahlberg et al. [5], most papers 
published around mobile payments cover technical 
issues (e.g., security, protocols, systems architectures), 
or consumer-centric studies (e.g., adoption). This 
rather limited and fragmented scope could be partly 
explained by the recent emergence of mobile payment 
research. Due to the increased interest we can expect 
more diversity in the next years while research in this 
domain matures. 
Based on [5] we posit that there is a lack of multi-
perspective research that is needed to obtain a holistic 
view of payment system adoption and evolution. In 
addition, we need to conduct research that follows 
more than just one perspective at a time. Few studies, 
in fact, have looked at mobile payment diffusion in a 
systemic manner. Most investigations covering the 
topic have been carried out by consulting or industrial 
organizations (see e.g., [19]). There is a real need to 
engage in rigorous, theory based and multi-perspective 
explanations of the diffusion of mobile payments. 
As mentioned above, the consumer behaviors (i.e. 
the demand side of the market) have been well 
investigated. However, the other side of the markets 
(i.e., providers and merchants) needs more attention.  
Analyzing the dynamics of two-sided markets [17] 
such as electronic payment systems [6], from a 
multiple stakeholder perspective is required to better 
comprehend the diffusion process [12]. 
In addition, mobile payments are subject to network 
externalities [18]. In order to measure the value of the 
network, it is important to understand the dynamics of 
additional benefits brought by new users of the 
payment system. Both of the sides of the market 
(including consumers, merchants and providers) should 
be analyzed using network externalities. 
The evolution of the industry structure [11] is also 
essential to better comprehend the environment in 
which mobile payment solutions need to be embedded. 
A careful analysis of the context is required as factors 
of success or failure are strongly related to the 
industrial environment.  
Another important aspect is the internal 
organization and business logic of the mobile payment 
solution. One way to analyze this dimension is to look 
at the business model. Since business models of mobile 
payment solutions are heterogeneous, we need to 
analyze them along multiple dimensions to verify their 
alignment with the environment. Osterwalder and 
Pigneur have proposed an framework to describe and 
analyze business models [14] involving four elements. 
First, the Market focuses on the target customers and 
the channels to reach them. Second, we need to look at 
the Value Proposition, which comprises the service 
and the value perceived by the target customers. Third, 
to describe the technical issues, we use an 
Infrastructure perspective, and, finally, fourth, we 
discuss the Financial aspects (i.e., costs and revenues). 
After identifying all these perspectives we selected 
a number of frameworks from the mobile payment 
literature that cater for these dimensions. To take into 
account the economics of mobile payments, Au and 
Kauffman [1] have proposed a framework using 
economic theories such as network externalities, 
consumer choice and demand, switching costs, 
complementary goods, IT value, and economics of 
technology adoption and diffusion (see Figure 1). 
Then, in terms of industry structure and strategy, 
we found a framework by Dahlberg et al. [5] (adapted 
from [8, 4, 7]).  
 
Figure 1. Framework proposed by Au and Kauffman [1] 
 
This framework combines the five forces model [16] 
and the generic contingency theory [9, 15, 20] (see 
Figure 2). Porter's competitive factors help analyze the 
competitive dynamics of the industry. The contingency 
factors relate to environmental issues that are out of the 
direct control for adopters. All these factors are 
supposed to have a major impact on the mobile 
payment adoption. 
 
 
Figure 2. Framework proposed by Dahlberg et 
al. [5] 
Another framework by Dahlberg et al. [3] deals 
with how to analyze mobile payment solutions (Figure 
3). This framework provides several complementary 
perspectives to the ones already presented. A special 
focus here is given to resource based and resource 
dependent analysis affecting adopter behaviors. 
Furthermore, the framework includes issues related to 
business/economic and institutional factors. 
 
3. Mobile Payment cases in Switzerland 
 
3.1. Data collection and analysis 
We selected three visible and relevant mobile 
payment initiatives in the Swiss market. These cases 
illustrate well the efforts that have been carried in the 
past years in Switzerland. We analyzed the cases using 
materials collected during our previous research [13] 
and by obtaining new secondary sources (i.e., news, 
articles). Moreover, we contacted and interviewed key 
experts, who had been involved in the design and 
implementation of mobile payments in these cases. We 
analyzed the case data using the three frameworks to 
code the data. Furthermore, we described the business 
models underlying the cases using the four 
perspectives of the Business Model Ontology by 
Osterwalder and Pigneur [14]. 
The first case is the m-Maestro project, which was a 
common effort between the major Swiss companies to 
enable the Maestro card for m-commerce purchases 
and the top up of mobile phone prepaid accounts. The 
second case is the first European initiative to offer an 
m-commerce platform compliant with the “Verified by 
Visa” security standard. Finally, the last case is a 
mobile payment solution initiated by a major financial 
institution called PostFinance.  
 
Figure 3. Framework proposed by Dahlberg et al. [3]
 
None of these solutions have been successful so far. 
The m-Maestro project was never launched. It failed at 
the stage of design (which was mostly on paper). 
“Verified by Visa” platform has not seen new 
developments since the announcement of its 
implementation (failed after implementation). 
PostFinance abandoned the solutions after the first trial 
(failure after a real world test). Since the trial reported 
here PostFinance has launched a new scheme. This is 
more focused and less ambitious and gives up the goal 
of developing an extensive payment infrastructure as it 
mostly support remote purchases of digital goods (e.g. 
news, ticketing).  
We performed the same analysis on each of the 
three cases, but due to space limitation, we describe 
only one of the cases in detail (i.e., PostFinance). For 
completeness, we provide a brief explanation of the 
reasons why the two other schemes failed at different 
stages to highlight our dynamic approach.  
3.2. Description of the first two cases 
3.2.1. The m-Maestro project. The m-Maestro 
project was launched in the early 2000s. The objective 
was to enable the Maestro card (i.e., debit card) to pay 
for m-commerce transactions. The motivation was 
driven by the national mobile network operators 
(MNO), which wanted to have secure and convenient 
means to top up their prepaid accounts. Back then, 
prepaid accounts were usually charged using scratch 
cards. These cards were mostly sold in kiosks. 
Unfortunately, these kiosks took a 10% commission 
for each scratch card sold. Compared to the fees of 
traditional payment means such as debit and credit 
cards, these scratch cards were quite inefficient and not 
profitable for the MNOs. Since the Maestro card was 
getting more popular, MNOs were thinking about a 
solution based on this debit card. Moreover, by 
extension, this card could be used to buy digital or 
physical goods without charging the monthly MNO 
bill. The expected benefit was that the monthly bill, 
which contained voice and data consumption 
information, would not be “polluted” with extra 
information about third-party financial transactions. 
Furthermore, the MNOs wanted to benefit from the 
risk management provided by the banks. On the side of 
the financial institutions, this project mainly aimed at 
creating a new channel for the Maestro card. 
As the project faced several technical challenges 
and priorities changed the trial was never launched 
despite the MNOs’ initial enthusiasm. Part of the 
failure could also be explained by the fact that the 
project took place too early. Looking back, the market 
was likely to be unprepared for such an initiative. The 
volume of transaction was too low, which made the 
cost of the design, implementation, and operation hard 
to justify. As a result, without the support of the whole 
industry, the m-Maestro project was abandoned. 
Nothing happened after the first round of non-
fulfillment. Despite the failure, the project was an 
excellent source of learning for the Swiss banking and 
mobile industries. Most of the experts involved during 
the trial are still active in the mobile payment area. 
3.2.2. Secure Mobile Commerce - Visa. In 
Summer 2006, Corner Bank and its partners announced 
the first European mobile commerce solution using the 
secure standard “Verified by Visa”. The solution has 
been named Secure Mobile Commerce. The basic idea 
was that the Visa card could be used securely for m-
commerce transactions.  
Corner Bank, one of the major Swiss credit card 
issuers, offered to their cardholders the possibility to 
use their Visa cards to make secure payments in mobile 
shops. Thanks to the partnership with Sunrise (a Swiss 
MNO), Corner Bank cardholders could use the scheme 
to pay in a mobile music store (musicfinder). 
The deployment of the solution required the 
participation of companies with diverse knowhow. 
Telekurs Multipay was in charge of the acquisitions 
and the linkages of mobile shops to Visa payment 
system. Datatrans developed the interface between the 
mobile shop checkout page, and Telekurs created the 
payment system.  Arcot, a payment security specialist, 
provides the authentication mechanisms for a secure 
“Verified by Visa” transaction with the mobile phone. 
Finally Crealogix was responsible for the development 
of the mobile shop with the extension of the 
musicfinder. The service was never adopted widely 
due to its limited focus and benefits. 
 
3.2. Mobile Payments by PostFinance 
The most widely known mobile payment scheme in 
Switzerland comes from PostFinance. PostFinance 
tends to be generally a first mover in many fields 
related to retail banking. Furthermore, it dominates the 
payment traffic in Switzerland with more than 3.3 
million accounts1 (in a country of about 7.5 million 
habitants). This makes PostFinance a strong player in 
the mobile payment arena. It has large customer and 
merchant base for daily payments (about 60% of the 
market share). 
PostFinance has launched two distinct mobile 
payment initiatives. The first one consisted of a trial 
for proximity payments, and the second one a remote 
mobile payment solution to pay for online purchases. 
For the purpose of this research, we primarily focus on 
the first trial launched in 2005 in the city of Bern. We 
selected this trial, because it is the major attempt to 
propose proximity payments using a mobile phone. 
Furthermore, in case of the success of the trial, the 
tried out scheme was supposed to be launched 
nationally.  
To characterize the internal organization of the 
trial, we use a simplified version of the Business 
Model Ontology [14]. The instantiation of the 
framework enabled us to better understand the business 
logic underlying the PostFinance's solution. This step 
was essential in order to evaluate the alignment of the 
business model with the environment. This evaluation 
would then help us unveil a number of internal factors 
that can lead to success or failure. 
The market PostFinance was targeting were holders 
of post accounts, and user of mobile phones. The 
objective was to link accounts to mobile phone 
numbers. Their target customer segment was fairly 
large. For the trial, they tested the scheme only with 
employees of the involved companies (about a 
thousand participants).  
The value proposition was about offering a 
convenient and secure way to pay for physical goods 
using a mobile phone. PostFinance customers would 
have more flexibility by having an extra means of 
payment. On their side, the merchants saw 
opportunities to improve their payment process by 
enhancing their customer relationship management by 
having the possibility to offer new types of 
personalized coupons. 
In terms of infrastructure, PostFinance collaborated 
with Unisys and Gavitec to design the payment 
solution. Due to the proposed solution, PostFinance 
could bypass the MNOs by using them only as carriers. 
PostFinance also managed to involve various partners 
in the retail industry. During the trial, merchants 
accepted the payment instrument at twelve locations in 
Bern. The list of participants comprised of two largest 
Swiss retailers (Migros, Coop), McDonald’s, two 
                                                 
1
 Key figures 2007 from PostFinance website 
electronic retailers (Interdiscount, Mobilezone), the 
Postshops, and the Swiss national railways (SBB). An 
additional payment terminal was added at the point of 
sale of each participant’s shops in Bern. The terminal 
enabled the merchant to read a special bar code (Data 
Matrix) received via text message on the buyer mobile 
phone. The payment process could be described as 
follows: The payment process is initiated at the point 
of sale (POS) by the consumer by (i) scanning the 
barcode stuck on the back of the mobile phone and (ii) 
typing a PIN code on a terminal. Then, (iii) the 
merchant enters the amount of the purchase on the 
same terminal using a small externally attached 
keyboard. From there, (iv) the information is 
transmitted to the PostFinance m-payment platform. A 
few seconds later, if all checks are cleared, (v) the 
consumer gets an SMS with a barcode and some 
information concerning the purchase (name of the 
merchant, the amount of the purchase, and the date). If 
the consumer agrees, (vi) the barcode in the SMS has 
to be scanned by the terminal to conclude the 
transaction. Finally, (vii) the terminal confirms the 
purchase and the consumer gets a receipt of the 
purchase. The payment amount is debited in real time 
from the customer’s PostFinance account.  
As the trial was an extension of the Postcard, the 
major impacts on the financial aspects remained in the 
cost of the infrastructure deployed, the extra cost of 
issuing additional payment means, and advertising to 
increase the general awareness of mobile payments. 
Expected revenues come from transaction fees paid by 
the merchants, a licensing fee that other financial 
institutions would pay to join and use the scheme, and 
finally potential fees from mobile coupons. Moreover, 
the positive impacts on the purchase experience could 
motivate customers to spend more. 
 
4. Analysis of the three Swiss cases  
As noted, several researchers have identified the 
need of a multi-perspective analysis and to this end 
have proposed frameworks that need to be taken into 
account when analyzing mobile payment diffusion. In 
this section, we use these frameworks as alternative 
filters to unveil potential factors of failure.  
 
4.1. Short analysis of the first two cases 
Due to space limitations we can only provide a 
short description of what were the factors which made 
m-Maestro and “Secure Mobile Commerce” fail. For 
m-Maestro, the lack of a strong actor who could push 
the solution forward by forcing/motivating the other 
parties to collaborate was a killing factor. Under these 
conditions any mobile payment solution would have 
difficulties to be launched. 
Despite a relatively good technology and business 
case, the actors failed to find a solution which would 
match their individual utilities (i.e., Pareto 
equilibrium). Because of the problems of coordination 
the solution did not succeed and was abandoned. As 
we could observe, m-Maestro mostly failed because of 
the lack of support from different stakeholders.  
On the contrary, the “Secure Mobile Commerce” of 
Corner Bank was able to gather and motivate all the 
actors necessary to provide the solution. However, it 
failed to involve both consumers and merchants. In this 
case, we had some powerful actors willing to launch a 
solution. Unfortunately, they did not solve the issue of 
two-sided markets, which is to involve both the 
demand and supply side of the market to get the wagon 
rolling.  They failed to generate network externalities 
though appropriate actor incentives either for the 
customers or the merchants to join. 
 
4.2. PostFinance analysis 
4.2.1 Economic analysis of PostFinance solution. 
To conduct an economic analysis of PostFinance 
solution, we use the first framework proposed by Au 
and Kauffman [1]. This framework looks at the mobile 
payment market using an economic perspective (Figure 
1). The first step is to identify different stakeholders of 
the market. The technology producers are the firms or 
organizations providing the mobile payment product or 
service. They symbolize the supply-side of the market. 
In our case, PostFinance, Gavitech, and Unisys are the 
technology producers. There are also the users, 
consumers, and buyers. On the other side there are the 
merchants that participate in the mobile payment 
scheme. In addition, we have the government and 
regulators which control and regulate the market.  
In their framework, Au and Kauffman also include 
different levels of impact on the stakeholders. The 
most direct impacts are related to network externalities. 
In fact, in order for PostFinance's scheme to be 
successful, a large number of customers and merchants 
need to adopt the payment scheme. By involving the 
major retailers (Migros and Coop) in Switzerland, 
PostFinance sought to create a fairly large network of 
points-of-sale (POS), which would accept mobile 
payments and consumers would have many places 
where to pay with their mobile phone. The "chicken-
and-egg" problem would be partly solved by having a 
large merchant base before offering the solution to the 
consumers. With more consumers and merchants on 
board, PostFinance would increase the value of the 
payment solution.  
Based on their preferences for payments in specific 
contexts, the consumers would have an additional 
possible payment instrument. The choice will mostly 
depend on which payment solution maximizes the 
utility of the consumers. The consumers will seek the 
best option in the range of the options available. In 
other words, the consumers will have to decide which 
payment instrument is the most suitable and brings the 
best value to the transaction. The value perceived could 
be financial (e.g., discount, loyalty scheme with 
rewards), practical (e.g., speed, convenience), or 
psychological (e.g., trust, fashionable). Going back to 
PostFinance scheme it is not clear what would have 
been its value for the consumers. To change customer 
behavior towards payments, a clear added-value should 
have been perceived when using the new scheme. This 
rule applies also for the merchants as they expect 
benefits or incentives when adopting a new payment 
scheme. In the PostFinance case the value perceived 
for mobile payments was probably not great, because 
the technology deployed was not more efficient (faster) 
than the traditional payment with cards. However, the 
merchants saw an opportunity to offer a personalized 
loyalty scheme to their customers. The scheme would 
allow merchants to send coupons directly to the mobile 
phone of their customers. This additional service 
bundled with the payment solution appeared promising 
in order to increase the value for the merchants and the 
consumers.   
By providing a new electronic payment solution, 
PostFinance would reduce the number of cash-based 
transactions. As these transactions are quite expensive, 
there might be some cost reduction related to the 
adoption of mobile payments. This is the case only, if 
the transaction fees are not too high. Since PostFinance 
is offering mobile payments based on their direct debit 
scheme, the transaction fees would not differ from the 
use of the PostCard. 
Other secondary impacts comprise issues such as 
switching costs, quality of service and accessibility. 
Once the solution has created network externalities, 
then, the providers hope that customers will join in 
mass. Switching costs could be seen as a barrier for 
adoption. However, the solution designed should limit 
the financial (e.g., cost of the solution), psychological, 
and practical hurdles for PostFinance customers. In 
order to fully satisfy the consumers, PostFinance had to 
provide a secure and reliable payment solution. Later 
impacts (third-level) could be related to regulations and 
policies that have to be put in place in order to control 
the monetary and fiscal issues. PostFinance did not 
have problems since their mobile payment solution was 
just an additional channel to access their existing 
payment system. They were compliant with all the 
regulation in place. 
4.2.2 PostFinance: a strategic analysis. For the 
strategic and environment analysis, we use the 
framework proposed by Dahlberg et al. [5]. Porter's 
competitive factors help us to analyze the 
competitiveness of the industry surrounding 
PostFinance. The contingency factors relate to 
environmental issues that are beyond the direct control 
of PostFinance. 
We start the analysis by looking at the contingency 
factors that have great influence on the Swiss mobile 
payment market. In terms of social and cultural 
environment, the Swiss market is quite traditional and 
sometimes considered conservative. In terms of 
payments, Swiss consumers and merchants use the 
same payment instruments as in other Western 
countries. PostFinance tried to take advantage of the 
widespread use of mobile phones and its widely 
adopted PostCard (i.e., debit card). The combination of 
both technologies seemed promising. However, Swiss 
consumers might not be ready for such an important 
evolution of their current payment instruments. 
Switzerland, as well as other Western countries, has 
been exposed to changes in the commercial 
environment with the emergence of e-commerce and 
other advances in mobile telecommunication. In the 
convergence of the banking and telecommunication 
industry we have witnessed the development of mobile 
banking platforms. Moreover, mobile network 
operators have been pushing new mobile services and 
content through their mobile portals. All of these 
evolutions made mobile payments look like a valuable 
addition to the existing portfolio of services. This 
opens new opportunities for PostFinance to innovate in 
the payments. 
In terms of technology, Switzerland has good 
telecommunication, banking, and payment 
infrastructures. On the industry side, most of the 
technology building blocks are available to launch a 
mobile payment scheme. However, the consumer 
mobile phones capabilities are still limited in offering 
proximity mobile payments. Therefore, PostFinance 
had to find the best available technologies compatible 
with the current set of consumer’s mobile phones. 
They decided to use SMS for the payment scheme, as it 
was a standard implemented in all mobile phones on 
the market. Near field communication (NFC), a 
technology similar to RFiD standards, would have 
been clearly a much better choice for the type of 
payment scheme they launched. Unfortunately, it was 
not available in the market and is still awaited today.  
Regulation in Switzerland has not been a real issue. 
Besides banking license regulation and electronic 
money directives, PostFinance did not have to worry 
with its mobile payment scheme, as they are already 
compliant with all regulations.  
Standardization in mobile payments is clearly a 
critical issue. In Switzerland, the market is too small to 
offer different standards to consumers. This is the 
reason why PostFinance wanted to establish its 
solution as a “de-facto” open standard. The objective 
was that other financial institutions could be able to 
join this interoperable scheme. 
Consumers have the power to adopt a new payment 
scheme. They can also express needs and therefore, 
frame the requirements for payment solutions that 
would suit their behaviors. For PostFinance, it was 
important that consumers were willing to accept the 
use of mobile payments. However, past experiences in 
payments showed that consumers did not have a great 
influence on the design of solutions. Most of the 
payment instruments were imposed from the providers 
without a clearly defined demand from the consumers. 
In order to facilitate a wide adoption and generate 
network externalities, merchants need to be involved in 
the deployment of mobile payments. Without the 
support of merchants, the solution would have more 
difficulties to become accepted in the market. 
PostFinance understood this issue well as they 
involved the most influent and important retailers in 
Switzerland. Merchants have some bargaining power 
as the additional payment instrument is not 
indispensable. Since they have to make substantial 
investments in order to upgrade their current point of 
sales systems they can negotiate lower transaction fees. 
Traditional payments such as cash, debit and credit 
cards represent competing solutions that mobile 
payments need to displace in the proximity payment 
area. PostFinance had to find a way to provide more 
value than existing payment solutions. By offering 
more capabilities such as mobile couponing, merchants 
and consumers could be interested to adopt 
PostFinance's scheme. This would add value that could 
make a difference when compared to traditional 
payments. Unfortunately, PostFinance failed to provide 
better value. 
New electronic payment services such as Paypal 
could have an impact on the adoption. However, the 
position of the proximity payment solution of 
PostFinance was not likely to be threatened by remote 
payment solutions. However, depending on how the 
market evolves, these online payment methods could 
reach the mobile phone. In fact, Mobile Paypal was 
launched few months after PostFinance solution. 
Moreover, with the emergence of mobile phone, such 
as the iPhone, the mobile Internet is becoming a new 
channel that could be exploited. 
Looking at the competition in the Swiss mobile 
payment market, PostFinance had an ideal position to 
impose their solution. The other major financial 
institutions in Switzerland do not consider mobile 
payments as a profitable business. Since PostFinance is 
the largest payment service provider in Switzerland, 
mobile payments could become an additional 
competitive weapon for them. Mobile network 
operators are also interested in this market. However, 
the tendency has been towards collaboration between 
the telecom and the financial industries. PostFinance 
mobile proximity payments did not have any 
competing alternative. Therefore, PostFinance could 
gain a first mover advantage [10] by imposing their 
solution as a standard.  
4.2.3 Analysis of PostFinance: a resource 
perspective. The third framework [3] focuses on 
resource based and resource dependent perspectives. 
One of the aspects therein is to analyze the actors, 
their linkages, and their power already covered with 
the previous framework. However, it is interesting to 
examine the institutional support that PostFinance 
needed in order to succeed. Despite its partnership with 
other organizations (e.g., Swisscom), PostFinance had 
difficulty in convincing other actors to join the mobile 
payment scheme. Most of the other players adopted a 
wait-and-see position. PostFinance had to take all the 
risks in the hope of eventually getting a competitive 
and first mover advantage. Since PostFinance operates 
its own payment network, the most important resources 
were already available. Crucial elements for the 
deployment of the infrastructure were the payment 
terminals. Retailers had to add another terminal to their 
existing point of sale infrastructure. Without the 
support of the merchants, PostFinance would have had 
a significant problem to solve. 
PostFinance integrated its mobile payment scheme 
into the existing infrastructure. The objective was to 
launch the scheme with a minimal infrastructure 
change. On the side of the consumers, the mobile 
payment scheme was designed to be compatible with 
most existing mobile phones. Instead of introducing 
new technology, PostFinance used current technologies 
to propose a new system. 
The Swiss market is not large enough to support 
several payment schemes. PostFinance hoped that by 
proposing the first system others would have no other 
choice but join. Indeed, PostFinance was trying to 
enable a new channel for its own payment system. In 
the mobile payment proximity area, there were no 
direct competitors. PostFinance had a good position to 
impose itself as the leader. To validate findings we also 
interviewed the mobile payment project manager of 
PostFinance. He confirmed that our findings were 
relevant and explained well the outcome of the failed 
trial. PostFinance’s trial was discontinued, as several 
key factors were not satisfying (Table 1). 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
The juxtaposition of the three frameworks helped 
us to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the failure 
of mobile payment diffusion in Switzerland using 
multiple perspectives: economic, strategy, resource 
based, and behavioral. The applied frameworks were 
complementary with some redundancy. 
In general, the account of the diffusion process and 
factors that influence it is rich and relatively complete. 
To wit, we were able unveil most factors that led the 
implementations and designs to fail in the early stages. 
The analysis shows, however, that each framework 
misses some critical factors. First, the high level of 
abstraction of these frameworks makes them difficult 
to apply in concrete situations ex ante. Second, none of 
the frameworks encompasses the dynamics of the 
diffusion and only provides a static view of mobile 
payment diffusion trajectory. Even though, they can be 
instantiated several times during the study period and 
comprise of several dynamic factors, they are not 
inherently dynamic: they do not propose a sequence of 
stages where the analysis needs to be performed 
differently. At each stage, however, we detected 
different factors that impede the progress. Therefore 
the frameworks need to be augmented with a dynamic 
model of the diffusion stages as shown in Table 1. 
Third, the frameworks did not observe behavioral and 
coordination challenges associated with embedding the 
mobile payments in local contexts and the need for 
scaling the service for growth. Though PostFinance 
met most positive conditions for introducing a viable 
service based on its dominant position and active 
involvement of major retailers, it failed to provide 
additional value for consumers and local merchants. In 
contrast, PostFinance faced significant difficulties in 
finding a feasible trade-off between interoperability 
and the ease of use for consumers. It had to sacrifice 
the ease of use for interoperability and scale, which 
resulted in a clumsy solution, which did not fit with the 
physical environment and the behaviors associated 
with payments in local stores. Consumers have deeply 
ingrained habits to pay in certain ways with associated 
physical behaviors. Many criticized the chosen solution 
as the payment  terminals  were  too  cumbersome  and  
 
Table 1.  Dynamic model of the diffusion stages of a mobile payment solution 
Phases Main evidence from the cases Au and Kauffman [1] Dahlberg et al. [5] Dahlberg et al. [3] 
1. Build an alliance 
between MNO and 
Financial institutions 
m-Maestro: they did not reach a 
consensus. It failed to convince 
every actor. 
PostFinance: they were able to 
bypass the MNOs by using them as 
simple carrier. They did not need 
other financial institutions as they 
already operate their own payment 
network.  
- Stakeholder 
identification 
 
  
- Competition between 
the providers 
- New and competing 
e-payment and 
traditional systems  
-> PostFinance: they 
have a great position 
to compete and lead 
the market 
- Interested 
Organizations / Key 
Market Actors 
PostFinance: 
Difficulties to 
involve and get the 
support of the other 
service providers 
2. Involve the sellers and 
business intermediaries 
side (i.e., merchants) in 
the development and 
deployment of the service. 
Build a sufficient supply 
in two-sided markets. 
“Secure Mobile Commerce”: they 
did not involve enough actors 
(merchants) to generate the network 
effects. 
PostFinance: they involved the 
major merchants of Switzerland, 
which created an important 
network. 
- Network externalities 
- Cost reduction -> 
PostFinance: 
merchants could 
decrease the number 
of cash-based 
transactions 
- Merchant power -> 
PostFinance: 
Merchants could 
bargain to reduce the 
transaction fees 
- Economic/Business 
Factors 
- Interested 
Organizations / Key 
Market Actors 
3. Provide an adequate 
value for the consumers to 
join the service. Generate 
incentives to create 
demand in two-sided 
markets.  
“Secure Mobile Commerce”: the 
low number of point of acceptance 
did not create value for consumers. 
PostFinance: they failed to create a 
real value for consumers (compared 
to existing systems) 
- Consumer choice 
- Switching cost -> 
PostFinance: existing 
customer would not 
have to pay extra  
- Quality of service 
- Accessibility 
- Customer power 
- Changes in 
Social/Cultural 
Environment -> 
Swiss consumers are 
relatively conservative  
 
- Economic/Business 
Factors 
4. Involve the 
manufacturers to scale the 
system and offer 
interoperability and ease 
of use. Build up 
interoperable standards for 
connectivity and 
transactions 
PostFinance: they involved 
different technology providers and 
integrators. However, the mobile 
phone manufacturers did not 
participate. They ended up with a 
non-standard solution. A Swiss 
interoperable standard is key in 
order to succeed. 
- Technology value 
- Accessibility 
- Changes in 
Technological 
Environment -> 
Emergence of e-/m-
commerce brings a 
new opportunities for 
mobile payments 
- Technology factors 
-> PostFinance: 
they ignore relevant 
technology factors 
due to infrastructural 
constraints 
1-4. Deal with regulatory 
issues (restrictions, 
incentives, obligations) 
PostFinance: they were already 
compliant with all the current 
regulations.  
- Monetary and fiscal 
policies 
- Changes in Legal, 
regulatory, and 
standardization 
environment 
- Institutional 
factors 
bulky, and the sticker in the back of the mobile phone 
looked just too cheap. Likewise, the payment process 
was not simpler and faster than the use of the 
traditional PostCard. The solution therefore met with 
resistance both at the consumer and local merchant 
side. Partially this was due to the lack of adequate 
standardization for introducing technical solutions that 
would allow for simple local behaviors. The original 
design choices were made in order to enable the largest 
number of customers to participate in the payment 
scheme. Yet, if standardized and cheaper NFC 
technologies had been made available, the proposed 
solution would have probably worked better.  
As discussed above, the use of frameworks to study 
the environment offered an occasion for expansive 
learning. However, without the description of the 
business models using Osterwalder and Pigneur's 
ontology [14], we would not have been able to 
differentiate business logics associated with different 
cases. By having a better overview of the business 
models, we could better evaluate the fit between the 
solutions and the environment.  
Future research is needed to formulate a more 
complete framework grounded in the richer process 
data of mobile payment diffusion trajectories. We plan 
to expand the current framework with findings from 
the study of actual diffusion processes. In Table 1, we 
outline the phases of mobile payment diffusion and 
suggest which factors are likely to promote success in 
different stages based on the findings from the cases. 
We also aim to conduct a set of more encompassing 
case studies in several national and industry contexts. 
In this way, we hope to unveil a more complete set of 
factors that influence the success of payment solutions 
in a given environment. By aggregating findings from 
these studies, we expect to solicit a more encompassing 
suite of explanatory patterns in the diffusion of mobile 
payments. Another direction is to apply the proposed 
model to investigate other mobile services including 
location-based services or mobile TV. These solutions 
share similar characteristics including two-sided 
markets, importance of the network externalities, 
complex and embedded technology, coordination 
challenges across industries raising significant 
standardization challenges, and thus are mostly likely 
driven by the same set of factors. However, these 
services differ as they create new markets and new 
streams of revenues, which is not the case with mobile 
payment solutions where the solution directly 
competes with existing solutions.  
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